At least fifteen people were killed and 40 more wounded on 16 May when a suicide car bomber attacked a convoy of foreign advisors in Kabul. Six Americans were amongst those killed in the attack which was claimed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami (HeI). HeI last struck the capital in September 2012 when a female suicide bomber targeted the road leading to Kabul International Airport killing twelve people, including nine Westerners. The group rarely conducts suicide bombings and when it does it is generally to highlight Hekmatyar’s ability to destabilise the country. This incident was therefore likely a warning not to exclude HeI from any negotiations with the Taliban. In addition, Hekmatyar will want to reinforce his influence ahead of the 2014 withdrawal of NATO forces.

The Taliban also retains a significant capability to strike Kabul. The last suicide bombing conducted by the group in the capital was outside the Defence Ministry during an unannounced visit by the US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in March. This year’s fighting season is crucial for the group since it will seek to undermine President Karzai’s administration whilst strengthening its position ahead of any talks with the US and the expected troop withdrawal next year. It is therefore likely that attacks across the country will increase during the Taliban’s Spring offensive. In this period, nine US troops were killed in two separate bombings in Kandahar Province and three soldiers from the Georgian contingent were killed in a bomb attack on their base in Helmand Province.

Meanwhile, four of the eight Turkish engineers who were kidnapped when their helicopter was forced to land in Logar Province due to bad weather were released (see our previous Report). The Taliban described the move as a goodwill gesture and as we previously indicated, the group is unlikely to hold Sunni Muslims suggesting that the other hostages will also be released soon.

In the meantime, a Turkish businessman was kidnapped in Kabul. It is unclear who is holding him but the risk of kidnap will increase throughout the NATO withdrawal process due to an expected deterioration in the security environment. Criminal gangs, the Taliban and local warlords are all likely to increase such activities in the coming year.

On 2 May police apprehended two alleged jihadists carrying pipe bombs travelling on Jakarta’s main thoroughfare, Jalan Sudirman. Explosives and bomb-making equipment were subsequently discovered at their rented house in the Kemang area of Jakarta. Subsequently, on 8-9 May the police anti-terrorism squad Densus 88 carried out raids against suspected jihadists in seven locations in West and Central Java. Densus 88 claims that seven suspects were killed following gun battles in Kebumen and Batang, Central Java and Cigondewah, West Java. Thirteen people have been detained and small arms, pipe bombs and other explosives were found at several of the locations.

There are plausible but unconfirmed reports that both sets of suspected jihadists were plotting an attack against the Myanmar Embassy and the two groups may therefore be directly linked. The choice of target reflects the growing international prominence of Myanmar’s sectarian violence between the Muslim Rohingya minority and the Buddhist majority (see our recent Myanmar reporting). Indeed, our 14 September Indonesia Report indicated that militants in Depok, south-west of Jakarta were planning on attacking Buddhists, likely as a response to the anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar. The relatively poor security around the Myanmar Embassy, compared to Western embassies, may also have been a factor in the choice of target.

There are unconfirmed reports that the militants captured and killed in the 8-9 May raids also planned to target the Glodok shopping centre in North Jakarta. This area has a large Chinese population, many of whom are Buddhists, and is also associated with the sex industry, and both factors may have prompted its selection.

There are claims that Abu Roban, who was killed during the raid in Batang, Central Java, had close links to a significant jihadist figure called Abu Omar. Omar established Jemaah Islamiyah networks across Southeast Asia in the mid-1990s and was active throughout the region until his arrest in East Kalimantan on the island of Borneo in July 2011. If Roban did have links to Abu Omar, this latest incident provides further evidence that the current generation of Islamist militants has been unable to replicate the concerted, sophisticated threat posed by the veteran jihadists who recruited and inspired them.

Nevertheless, the capture of a jihadist cell armed with explosives in the capital demonstrates that militants still pose a limited threat to Jakarta. Indeed, we reported the arrest of several suspected jihadists in Jakarta in March (see our 22 March Report). However, this series of high-profile raids and arrests reflect the significant capabilities of the intelligence and security forces, which further reduces the risk of a successful large-scale attack in the capital or elsewhere.

Taliban attacks on the secular-leaning Muttahida Quami Movement, Pakistani People’s Party and Awami National Party have continued ahead of legislative elections scheduled for 11 May. Most incidents have occurred in Karachi and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (where the group’s capabilities are strongest), but they have had the effect of restricting campaigning nationwide. We expect the attacks to continue until the vote is held and indeed believe that recent statements made by the Taliban calling for a boycott of the vote means that the group will seek to target polling stations nationwide on Election Day.

Recent polling has suggested that the Pakistani Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) is set to dominate the ballot, with its leader Nawaz Sharif seeming the most plausible post-election Prime Minister. The party has not been subject to the same level of Taliban threat, largely because when in opposition, it was not an advocate of military operations in the Tribal Areas and it promoted opening a dialogue with the group. Nonetheless the PML-N is unlikely to win an outright majority and so will likely need to broker a coalition following the polls. This could potentially delay the formation of the new Cabinet, which in turn could promote economic and political disorder (see below).

Opinion polls also project that the Pakistan Tehrik e Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, is set to secure a significant portion of the vote. Again, the party’s campaign has benefited from an absence of Taliban targeting. Moreover, it appears set to profit from a projected high turnout amongst young first-time voters, a demographic attracted to Khan’s anti-Americanism and the PTI’s position outside of the political establishment. However, the party may find it hard to actually win seats, with Pakistan’s first-past-the-post electoral system working against its geographically spread support base.

Criticism of the PML-N and PTI for not condemning the Taliban’s targeting of the secular-leaning parties has been growing. Should the two secure a good result in the election it is possible that the parties whose campaigning has been restricted may seek to challenge the legitimacy of the result. The judiciary have used the courts to manipulate previous Governments and are likely to indulge any such efforts. Any future PML-N-led Government could therefore see both its legality and authority questioned from its inception.

The next Government will have to tackle challenges in the form of the Taliban insurgency, border issues with Kabul (see today’s Afghanistan Report) and the public finances (see below). Moreover it will have to oversee the appointment of a new President, Army Chief of Staff and Chief Justice before the end of the year (although some of the incumbents may have their tenure extended). Significantly an administration weakened by legal wrangling over its legitimacy will be less able to tackle these issues, to the detriment of both security and stability.

Paris’s intervention in Mali continues to stoke anti-French sentiment throughout the region. For example, today’s Qatar Report discusses the case of two Islamists who sent a threatening letter to the French Embassy in Doha in response to Paris’s actions. Similarly, our 23 April Special Report discussed that day’s bombing of the French Embassy in Tripoli. On the same day, shots were fired near the French Embassy in Sanaa. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQM) had previously threatened to target the interests of nations which have participated in the military action in Mali. Regional states which participate in MINUSMA face a particular threat, though French interests will likely remain the primary target.

Meanwhile, President Francois Hollande’s plans to widen France’s existing “burqa ban” are likely to anger many Muslims. Indeed, al-Qaeda has already cited the existing legislation in its propaganda as a justification for targeting France. There is therefore a risk of further protests and even attacks (including kidnappings) against French interests throughout the Islamic world, particularly in jihadist fronts like the Sahel or Afghanistan/Pakistan.

Finally, both al-Qaeda’s central leadership and AQM are capitalising on the intervention in Mali for their propaganda, fuelling the growth of jihadist groups in Africa. For example, recent major clashes in Northern Nigeria involving the local group Boko Haram and both Nigerian and Chadian forces have killed at least 37 people, suggesting that Nigerian militants are growing in confidence, at least in part due to the situation in Mali.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has claimed that a further 1,000 fighters have travelled to Sabah in small groups to support the followers of Sultan Jamalul Kiram III. They have been engaged in clashes with the Malaysian armed forces since the self-styled Royal Army of the Sultanate of Sulu landed on the eastern coast of Sabah in early February. Whilst the figure of 1,000 fighters is most likely political exaggeration, Kuala Lumpur has acknowledged that small groups of armed supporters may have circumvented the naval cordon to support Filipino fighters in Sabah loyal to Jamalul (see this week’s Malaysia Report).

President Aquino repeated his criticism of the Sultan’s followers for the incursion into Sabah and, in a statement clearly aimed at MNLF leadership, hinted at hidden financial backers being responsible for prolonging the standoff. Meanwhile, the MNLF warned of a “long, protracted war” against Malaysia if Kuala Lumpur fails to heed UN calls for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In an attempt to seek further advantage, the MNLF central committee said it would also petition the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation following cases of human-rights violations allegedly committed by Malaysian forces.

As we have previously reported, the MNLF was sidelined by the October 2012 Bangsamoro Framework Agreement which the Government signed with the rival Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). We believe the MNLF may have provided support to the Sultan’s followers as a means of disrupting negotiations over the implementation of the peace deal and re-establishing its own standing.

Peace talks faced further delay in this period following Aquino’s request to postpone the 37th round of negotiations, days before the commencement of talks on 25 March. The President cited the need to review and consult on the draft annexes as justification for the delay. In response, MILF urged the international community to call for negotiations to be accelerated, warning that failure to conclude the process before Presidential elections due in May 2016 could lead to a resumption of violence in Mindanao.

Following a two-week delay, dialogue resumed this week with only the annex on normalisation, containing the most contentious issues of the peace talks, still being dealt with in lower-level technical working group discussions. Further delays in reaching agreement on the three remaining annexes on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and normalisation in the Bangsamoro territory could have far-reaching implications for the peace process. The Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC), tasked with writing the basic law to implement the deal, securing its passage through Congress and seeking its ratification by a majority of the voters in the proposed Bangsamoro territory has been unable to begin its work without agreement on the annexes. The BTC currently has only one year and nine months remaining of its two-year remit to achieve its objective.

MILF has thus far refrained from commenting on the Malaysian response to the incursion in Sabah given Kuala Lumpur’s involvement in the peace process. However, should violence in Sabah continue, or indeed escalate, it is increasingly likely that MILF will be drawn into the debate, with potential consequences for the peace process. Meanwhile, the MNLF is likely to seek to further capitalise on the situation in Sabah in the coming weeks to boost its political standing ahead of elections on 13 May and disrupt the peace process.

Separately, on 23 March, Australian Warren Rodwell was released by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) after the payment of a USD 97,750 ransom. Rodwell had been held by the group since December 2011 and ASG’s continued ability to secure significant funding in return for hostages will add to security risks, including kidnapping, in the South.

Prime Minister Netanyahu announced the formation of a coalition Government on 14 March. The Likud-Yisrael Beitenu bloc formed an alliance with Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid party and Naftali Bennett’s Jewish Home party in addition to the previously announced partnership with Tzipi Livni’s Hatnuah party. The ruling coalition retains 68 seats out of 120 in the Knesset.

Lapid was appointed Finance Minister and he is likely to institute austerity measures to tackle the budget deficit. The Cabinet extended the deadline to pass the budget from 45 days after the formation of the Government to 135 days. During his election campaign, Lapid argued for the introduction of universal conscription and the removal of state benefits for religious groups. Such measures are likely to be controversial, given that the ultra-orthodox parties are in the opposition for the first time in decades. There is a risk of street protests against such measures.

As previously discussed, Livni’s appointment as Justice Minister and her role in leading peace negotiations with the Palestinians will not yield a significant breakthrough, since Netanyahu will continue to shape Israel’s approach to talks. Moreover, the hardline Yisrael Beitenu leader Avigdor Lieberman is likely to return to head the Foreign Ministry after his trial for breach of trust and fraud. Consequently, the new Government remains unlikely to make concessions on the issue of settlement building, which the Palestinian Authority (PA) says must stop as a precondition to talks. Furthermore, Bennett, who has been appointed Minister of Industry, Trade and Labor, will maintain his pro-settlement stance, as will the new Defence Minister, Moshe Yaalon.

Tel Aviv is likely to maintain pressure on Washington over the Iranian nuclear programme, although President Obama reiterated his position on the issue during his visit to Israel on 20 March. Washington remains committed to exhausting diplomatic options while Netanyahu continues to call on the US to establish a “red line” for military intervention. Obama’s visit was largely symbolic, although Secretary of State John Kerry subsequently met with Netanyahu and PA President Mahmoud Abbas to discuss the stalled peace process. However, both men remain unwilling to make concessions on settlement building.

Finally, President Obama successfully mediated a rapprochement between Tel Aviv and Ankara during his visit to the region. Ties between Turkey and Israel deteriorated in 2010 after Israeli troops attacked a Gaza-bound aid flotilla killing eight Turkish activists. Netanyahu apologised to Prime Minister Erdogan for the incident and has agreed to make compensation payments, while Ankara has agreed not to pursue legal claims against the Israeli military. It is likely that fears about the impact of the Syrian civil war on Israel’s security motivated Tel Aviv to accept a compromise.

Propaganda releases from al-Qaeda’s franchises in Yemen and North Africa confirm the group’s continued focus on consolidating gains achieved by Islamists in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. While this means a reduced focus on attacks in the West, al-Qaeda continues to encourage radicalised youths there to act with little or no external direction or support. The ongoing conflicts in Syria and Mali are likely to increase the numbers willing to do so.

The key points are:

• Governments focus on Syria as likely future source of threats to Western Europe; British, Dutch, Belgian and German authorities all announce concerns over risk; counter-terrorism threat level increased in Netherlands ahead of coronation; arrests in credible plot and banning of three groups in Germany highlight issue there.

• Paris highlights increased domestic threat following Mali intervention; arrests in South again suggest credible plot foiled; killings of hostages in Mali and Nigeria and French statement suggest ransoms unlikely in future; Tunisia to remain key hub for al-Qaeda, but overt attacks there unlikely.

• Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula releases new edition of English-language propaganda magazine after ten-month gap; demonstrates al-Qaeda’s post-Arab Spring focus away from major attacks on West, importance of individual jihadists in maintaining pressure in Europe and US; issue contains ‘hit list’ and other suggested targets.

An investigation, headed by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, into a crackdown by security forces on protesters at the controversial Letpadaung copper mine in northern Myanmar, has recommended that work continue on expanding the site. The decision has created a backlash from locals who point to further environmental damage and forced relocation of local people if the mine continues to be developed. The report’s unpopular findings have meant that Suu Kyi has become the target of protests for the first time.

The Letpadaung mine is part of the larger Monywa copper mining site in Sagaing Division – the biggest and most lucrative of Myanmar’s mines, which is run by Wanbao, a subsidiary of the Chinese weapons giant Norinco. A crackdown in November 2012 against locals protesting against the mine, when phosphorus was used against the demonstrators, reflects pressure on the Government to protect Chinese interests in the country following Beijing’s anger at the suspension of the Myitsone Dam. Nonetheless, Suu Kyi’s report acknowledges that the mine brings only marginal benefit to locals.

The historical absence of environmental and social regulations governing the extractive sector in Myanmar has long been a source of popular discontent and many locals claim that they have been left destitute by the Monywa project. The report’s recommendation that the site should be expanded but that locals are compensated for loss of land and environmental checks are implemented has drawn criticism given the slow and opaque nature of such processes in Myanmar.

The anger towards Suu Kyi coincides with complaints from National League for Democracy (NLD) members of an authoritarian streak in the party. The NLD held its first ever conference this month but there was controversy beforehand after it suspended four members accused of promoting disunity. The members claim they had questioned the party’s decision-making processes. Despite talk of the NLD using the conference to bring younger members into the central committee, this appears not to have happened – possibly because older members believe there is now an opportunity for them to get into government.

The episode highlights the sensitive nature of the extractive industry in Myanmar, as well as the difficulties facing Suu Kyi as she moves from opposition figure towards a meaningful role in government. Parliament has agreed to discuss a review of the 2008 Constitution that effectively bars Suu Kyi from becoming President, on account of her marriage to a foreigner. The Constitution also reserves 25% of Parliamentary seats for uniformed military men and some unexpectedly voted in favour of the review.

If that process leads to Suu Kyi being allowed to run then she will be in the strongest position to win the 2015 election. However, further divisions in the NLD could undermine her position while those in Government who oppose Suu Kyi may try to expose her by appointing her to lead other unpopular initiatives such as the Letpadaung probe. This could force her into making controversial and unpopular decisions that may discredit her and ultimately damage the party’s support.

Washington and London have both announced their intent to give non-lethal assistance to armed rebel groups for the first time. The US has offered USD 60 million of food and medical supplies while the UK will provide armoured vehicles and body armour. US Secretary of State John Kerry justified this change in Washington’s stance by claiming that the risk of material supplied to “the moderate, legitimate opposition” being obtained by jihadists has fallen. This comes amid growing reports that the US and UK are helping to coordinate arms supplies and training for non-Islamist opposition elements (see today’s Jordan Report).

Britain has since stated that it may not abide by an EU embargo on selling arms to any Syrian groups, which we discussed last time. However, Western support for the rebels is likely to have only a limited immediate impact on the conflict since Riyadh and Doha have been providing arms for some time. Moreover, other nations such as Germany remain wary of supplying weaponry due to fears about the rebels’ lack of unity and the influence of Islamist and jihadist fighters. Indeed, there are growing reports of Islamists and jihadists establishing Sharia committees to enforce law and order in rebel-controlled areas. Some EU nations also want to avoid alienating Damascus’s Russian allies. Nonetheless, it is increasingly plausible that Western nations will start to arm non-Islamist and non-jihadist elements of the opposition.

Representatives of the Government and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) met in Kuala Lumpur on 28 February and signed an agreement to conduct peace talks aimed at resolving the insurgency in southern Thailand. The agreement, brokered by the Malaysian Government, is the first time that the Government has officially recognised and signed a formal agreement with any separatist group. On 4 March, the National Security Council announced that the first item for discussion with the BRN will be lifting of the State of Emergency in selected districts in the region and its replacement with the Internal Security Act (ISA, reported last time).

However, despite the landmark agreement Army Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha expressed scepticism and questioned how much influence the BRN had in the region, stating they do not represent the younger generation of insurgents. He also indicated that the security forces are currently increasing their presence in the region. As we reported last time, the Army has a vested interest in maintaining its influence in the region, since it uses the conflict to secure additional Government funding. Meaningful peace talks could therefore present a challenge to its standing. The Army will retain the power to declare martial law at any time under the ISA and its attitude could have a significant impact on the dialogue.

However, Prayuth’s comments also reflect the fact that the BRN does not represent many of the militant factions in the region. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C) is a more militant splinter group of the mainstream BRN and its armed wing, the Runda Kumpalan Kecil (RKK), is one of the largest insurgent groups in the region. On 3 March, security forces killed an RKK leader in Narathiwat while on 4 March the Permudan Baru Youth Movement, which also opposes talks with the Government, set fires in 41 locations across Yala.

In May 2012 militants carried out a high-profile bomb attack on a hotel in Hat Yai, Songkhla, outside the insurgents’ usual area of operations. We indicated at the time that hardline factions seeking to demonstrate their opposition to the covert talks between the security forces and some separatist groups may have been responsible for the attack (see our Report of 18 April). There is consequently a risk that the agreement with BRN could trigger a spike in violence by such elements in the South, or even isolated attacks in Songkhla.

Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra took credit for having engineered the deal with the Malaysian Prime Minister, adding that he was also seeking cooperation from the Indonesian President. Previous attempts at talks have failed to find any resolution and assistance from the Malaysian and Indonesian Governments could facilitate a meaningful dialogue. However, Thaksin’s involvement may complicate the process as the conflict was reignited whilst he was Prime Minister. If progress is to be made, the Government will now have to make good on promises such as repealing the State of Emergency, increasing self-rule, and demilitarisation (something the Army is likely to resist). There are consequently significant obstacles to any deal and the tempo of attacks by those groups not party to the agreement could increase in the coming weeks.