The Muslim Brotherhood has taken a number of steps towards a return to Parliamentary politics, which it has boycotted since refusing to participate in the November 2010 elections. It withdrew from the legislature in protest at the electoral system, which favours pro-Government tribes at the expense of urban areas (where the Brotherhood’s support is concentrated). However, in this period it met with representatives of the Government and the Royal Court suggesting serious attempts to resolve its differences with both.

 These meetings follow the clash between Brotherhood supporters and pro-Government tribesmen in Mafraq which we reported last time. This undermined relations between the Brotherhood and the recently appointed Prime Minister. It also damaged the already poor relations with the General Intelligence Department (GID, Jordan’s foreign and domestic intelligence service); the Brotherhood claimed that the local GID chief supported the attack. However, he has since been relocated – a significant concession to the Brotherhood, given that the GID is an influential force in Jordan.

 The Brotherhood has not protested for more than two weeks, suggesting that some trust has been restored. Moreover, the Shura Council of Jordan’s Brotherhood has granted independence to the movement’s foreign branches, which have had strong ties to Jordan’s wing. This is because they also have a close relationship with Hamas and the Brotherhood in Jordan is seeking to appear to distance itself from the Palestinian faction. This is an attempt to bolster the Brotherhood’s support within Jordan – including amongst the tribes – by demonstrating apparent independence from foreign influences. However, in reality close ties with Hamas will persist, given the large Palestinian population in Jordan.

 However, there are several issues that could undermine the Brotherhood’s embryonic steps towards Parliamentary participation, in particular any lack of reciprocal gesture by the Government to reform the electoral system. Without such a concession, it is likely that the Brotherhood will reject the political process and return to protests this year. Nonetheless, any unrest is unlikely to pose a major threat to the Kingdom’s stability, given the failure of demonstrations to force major reforms in 2011.

President Dilma Rousseff has announced plans for the construction of five new dams along the Tapajós River in the Amazon state of Pará. The sites are near to the cities of São Luiz do Tapajós, Jatobá, Jamanxim, Cachoeira do Caí and Cachoeira dos Patos. Controversially, the Government will reduce the area of three Amazonian national parks and four other conservation zones in Pará to allow for construction work.

Energy and Mining Minister Edison Lobão has stressed that new approaches and technology will minimise the environmental impact of the Tapajós dams. Most notably, these plans include flying in equipment and construction crews by helicopter to avoid building roads through the forest. Dam crews will also be housed in oil rig-like structures on the water once the projects are complete. Despite such mitigating measures and pledges to re-forest areas affected by construction, the environmental impact is still likely to be significant.

Dams remain a potent symbol for environmentalist, indigenous and landless worker groups so the projects could become targets for activists. Symbolic (but temporary) hostage-takings and sit-ins by indigenous groups are also possible, as we have seen recently. Companies involved in dam projects may therefore face both reputational and physical risk.

Celebrity involvement could increase media attention on the Tapajós project and its likely impact on local communities, including on residents displaced by flood zones and indigenous communities reliant on fishing. In the past there have been demonstrations outside Brazil at the offices of financial institutions funding such projects, highlighting the potential reputational risk for investors.

President Rousseff pledged to protect the environment ahead of the last Presidential elections but energy demand in Brazil is set to soar by an estimated 56% in the next decade. Consequently, the Government regards hydroelectric power as a key driver of economic growth. Thus, even legal cases designed to stop or slow construction of new dams are unlikely to succeed for long – judges overseeing similar cases have temporarily suspended work only to overturn their decision quickly. Nonetheless, the Tapajós decision will further tarnish Brazil’s reputation for environmental protection, coming so soon after the Senate’s approval last December of the controversial Forest Code that will allow for greater deforestation of the Amazon.

Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports emerged this period that illegal loggers in the north-eastern state of Maranhão used their vehicles last October to destroy a remote indigenous community 440 km south-west of the state capital São Luís, then tying up and burning alive a young child. An investigation has determined that illegal logging took place and that the indigenous camp was destroyed but the local witness who first reported the homicide has since retracted his claims (though officials suspect this may have been the result of intimidation).

In Rio de Janeiro, meanwhile, several dozen members of indigenous tribes are squatting in an old building next to the 83,000-seat Maracanã football stadium, currently undergoing renovation work ahead of the 2014 World Cup. Development plans call for the site to become either a shopping centre or a sports annex. The occupied building once housed the Museum of the Indian and tribesmen want to turn the facility into Rio’s first indigenous academic institution. The stand-off has so far not affected work on the stadium. However, as the World Cup draws nearer, environmental policy, deforestation, illegal logging and attacks on indigenous people, as well as the construction of new dams, could prompt indigenous activists to turn violent.

The US in this period agreed to sell Saudi Arabia USD 29.6 billion of arms – its largest ever export deal. Amongst other items, Riyadh will acquire 84 of the latest model of F-15 jets and upgrades for 70 more. The F-15 is an aging platform but one whose range and payload means it would be of use in a future conflict with Iran. Given current tensions between Iran, on one side, and Gulf countries and the US on the other, this deal was likely intended to put further pressure on Tehran. However, delivery of the aircraft will not begin until 2015, meaning that it has purely symbolic importance for now.

Meanwhile, Iranian media alleged major splits between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in this period – including fanciful claims that Qatar is preparing to occupy Saudi territory. The two Sunni monarchies compete for regional influence and have historically had a troubled relationship, not least over Doha-based broadcaster al-Jazeera’s criticisms of the Saudi royal family. Moreover, Tehran’s relations with Doha have traditionally been much warmer than those with Riyadh. A degree of disagreement is, therefore, credible. However, these latest reports come shortly after the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) rebuked Iran for interfering in member states’ internal affairs. Tehran therefore appears to be exaggerating existing Qatar-Riyadh tensions in an attempt to split the GCC at this key moment, although there is no evidence that this is working at present.

Finally, increased regional sectarianism and tensions with Iran led to yet more protests in the Shia-majority Eastern Province in this period. The authorities’ decision to launch at least three separate crackdowns in the area – a reaction to fears of Iranian meddling and recent violence in the area (discussed in our 25 November Report) – provoked further demonstrations. Such disturbances therefore seem certain to continue, not least after unconfirmed Iranian press reports suggested that security forces killed a Shia protester on 12 January.

Protests across Russia have shown no sign of abating in this period, as thousands have continued to attend weekly rallies organised by opposition parties. Moreover, on 24 December tens of thousands took to the streets to protest over last month’s disputed Parliamentary elections, dealing a blow to President Medvedev who had announced a series of concessions on the eve of the rally (see below). The significant turnout raises the possibility that such demonstrations could continue to build momentum in the lead up to the March Presidential elections. Indeed, the next rally has already been scheduled for 4 February.

The leaders of opposition parties and prominent figures such as the popular anti-corruption blogger Aleksey Navalny are actively involved in organising the rallies but the movement still lacks an established leadership. Putin has seized on this vulnerability as an excuse to reject calls to hold talks with the protesters. In contrast to Medvedev’s compromising stance, Putin appears out of touch with the situation and has repeatedly riled protesters, most recently describing them as “chattering monkeys”. His belligerence suggests that he does not feel sufficiently threatened to begin a dialogue with the nascent movement so long as it is without an established leadership.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin has also sought to capitalise on the fragmented nature of the opposition. Only days ahead of the 24 December rally, an online media outlet (partly owned by a close ally of Prime Minister Putin) published a series of compromising phone calls made by opposition leader Boris Nemtsov. In the course of the recordings Nemtsov can be heard to insult both his rivals and protesters repeatedly (whom he describes as “office plankton”).

At present, Putin remains the most likely candidate to win the Presidential elections, although his declining popularity suggests he may struggle to secure an outright victory at the first round. He faces little competition from the Communist and Yabloko parties which have opted to nominate their old guard leaders as Presidential candidates, instead of risking backing a new figure such as Aleksey Navalny. Meanwhile, the candidacies of several rivals – including Russian tycoon Mikhail Prokhorov – have now been accepted. It remains too early to determine whether any of them will be capable of harnessing sufficient support to represent a credible threat to Putin’s bid for the Presidency and at present there is no indication that the protest movement has a preference for any of the candidates.

On 19 December Syria finally signed an agreement allowing Arab League human rights inspectors into the country, the first of whom will arrive today, six weeks after the League first demanded that this happen. However, Damascus is trying to defer increased international pressure and will not implement the agreement in full because it includes demands for the withdrawal of soldiers from cities and free access for the media. This came after Russia unexpectedly proposed a UN Security Council Resolution condemning violence from both the Government and rebels (but which did not allow for sanctions).

The League had set a deadline of 21 December for monitors to be allowed in threatening otherwise to refer Syria to the UN Security Council. No discussion at the UN is now likely for several weeks – until it has been established (as appears inevitable) that Damascus has not fully implemented the deal. However, even if this happens the League ruled out support for military action of any kind and Turkey has consistently shown itself willing to act only following the lead of the Arab League leaving no viable international solution (of any kind) for the crisis.

The League’s threat was empty because Russia would certainly have vetoed sanctions. Indeed, Moscow recently delivered sophisticated anti-ship missiles to Syria, showing that – whilst it may encourage President Assad to present a more conciliatory image – it has no intention of allowing his regime to be destabilised. This will compound neighbouring countries’ fears (also elevated over the missile tests discussed in our 16 December Special Report and ongoing state-media reports of Air Force and Navy live-fire exercises) that the conflict in Syria could escalate and affect their security.

The opposition Syrian National Council (SNC) dismissed the Arab League deal as “worthless”. This came shortly after the Council’s first ever plenary meeting, held in Tunis, at which it sought to present a united and credible alternative to Assad. Meanwhile, coordinated military resistance was seen in the southern city of Deraa (where protests first began earlier this year) for the first time. Also, unconfirmed reports suggest the Army’s chemical warfare commander, General Mustafa al-Sheikh, has defected. Moreover, al-Qaeda’s Abu Yahya al-Libi called on Libyan jihadists to travel to Syria and fight. This comes after the credible reports, discussed last time, of Libyan Islamists providing support to the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA). We therefore judge that violent opposition to the regime – including from jihadists in support of the FSA – will only increase.

Al-Qaeda has continued to espouse its message of non-violent support for Islamist parties challenging for power following the Arab Spring, meaning that major attacks by the movement in Egypt remain unlikely for now. However, the movement called for support for jihadists in Syria, particularly from Libyan fighters, raising the likelihood of greater militant activity there while targeting of Israel may also be resumed. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda’s inability to negotiate with Tuareg kidnappers in the Maghreb may lead to an increased abduction risk across the Sahel.

The key points are:

-Al-Qaeda maintains support for peaceful uprisings where Islamists stand to gain power from political process; risk of greater jihadist activity in Syria and Israel; signs of Libyan support for fighters in Syria; attempt at re-engagement with alienated Algerian Berbers in former heartland

-Attack on Shia mosque in Kabul demonstrates differing sectarian agendas of jihadist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan

-Confirmation of death of British jihadist in drone strike highlights links between European cells and groups in Pakistan and Iraq; al-Zawahiri confirms death of senior Libyan cleric in drone strike, though he was not al-Qaeda’s number two as claimed by Washington

At least 60 people were killed when a suicide bomber attacked Kabul’s Abul Fazl shrine, close to the Presidential palace, during celebrations for the Shia festival of Ashura on 6 December. Shortly afterwards, a bomb exploded near the main Shia mosque in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif, killing four and injuring many more.  A second device placed nearby (probably to target first responders) was defused. Another bomb, this time in Kandahar, injured three at another Ashura ceremony, although the local police later claimed that it was not related to the Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif explosions.

A group calling itself Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Almi claimed the Kabul attack, noting that it was an offshoot of the Pakistan-based group Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ, which has demonstrated a sectarian agenda).  The Taliban quickly and categorically condemned the bombings and called on Shia religious and political leaders to prevent any sectarian enmity. The unambiguous nature of the Taliban statement suggests that it is unlikely that any group affiliated with the movement (al-Qaeda, for example, recognises Taliban leader Mullah Omar as the ultimate leader of the global jihad movement) was involved. Furthermore, the Taliban is largely non-sectarian, unlike its counterpart in Pakistan and al-Qaeda, in large part because one of its principal goals is to win public support (despite the collateral casualties that it causes).

LeJ, however, has never conducted an attack in Afghanistan before, raising questions over how it could succeed with such a major strike at its first attempt. It is unusual for a Pakistan-based group to operate abroad without support from at least elements in the Pakistani Army’s Inter-Services Intelligence Department (ISI). It may be, therefore, that the attacks were intended to provoke tensions between Islamabad and Kabul (and possibly also Washington). Certainly the Pakistani Taliban seems to have been talking with Islamabad during the period in question (see today’s Pakistan Report) and the ISI hopes that the Pakistani Taliban will refocus its activities against targets in Afghanistan. The 10 December assassination of another member of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council, which is tasked with engaging with the Taliban, may be an example of such activity.

Vice President Hadi appointed Mohammed Basindwa as the new interim Prime Minister who will lead the country until Presidential elections on 21 February 2012. Basindwa, a former Foreign Minister, left the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) ten years ago to stand as an Independent. The GPC and the Joint Meetings Party (JMP) have now agreed the formation of an interim Government which will be sworn in on 10 December. Each side will have 17 Ministries. The GPC will retain the Ministries of Defence, Foreign and Oil, while the JMP will be responsible for the Interior, Information and Finance.

The GPC and JMP have signalled that they are prepared to work together by acting quickly to enforce the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) deal signed in November and dividing the Ministries evenly. However it is significant that the GPC retains control of the Ministry of Defence and therefore the armed forces. The JMP is expected to demand an end to violence against the protesters, but GPC’s control of the military allows the JMP to distance itself from any responsibility for the Army’s actions.

Both the GPC and JMP have submitted candidates to take part in a 14-member panel that will be set up to reform the military. However, many branches of the Army are controlled by President Saleh’s relatives who will not be prepared to relinquish control. The panel is unlikely to have the ability to enforce changes, and so a significant restructure will not occur. This is likely to lose the new Prime Minister and his Government credibility in the eyes of the protesters, who are already angry at the terms of the GCC initiative.

Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar will also pose difficulties for the military council, as the GCC agreement did not deal with the issue of defected soldiers. He will be unwilling to re-integrate with an Army under the control of Saleh’s family members, and so will continue to be a challenge for the regime. A similar problem arises from tribes that remain opposed to the Government, such as the al-Ahmar. It has been involved in violent clashes with the security forces since May, and on 7 December exchanged fire with Government forces in the al-Hasaba district of Sanaa. Further incidents are likely and so the continued presence of armed groups will undermine the interim Government.

Fighting also broke out in Taiz on 26 November when Government forces shelled residential areas and clashed with armed tribesmen that support the protesters. Basindwa warned that if the violence did not end he could not form a Government. This prompted Hadi to call for a ceasefire on 3 December, but localised violence is likely to continue. The ongoing bloodshed demonstrates that the GCC deal has had little impact on the ground. Meanwhile hundreds of thousands of people continue to take to the streets demanding that Saleh be tried for corruption and the killing of protesters. Ongoing demonstrations risk further civilian casualties which could spark sustained violence such as seen in Taiz. This will also threaten the success of the GCC initiative.

US-Pakistani relations have suffered another setback in the wake of NATO air strikes on 26 November which killed 25 Pakistani troops at two observation posts in Mohmand Agency in the Tribal Areas. Islamabad disputes claims that the attack was provoked when a joint Afghan-US Special Forces team operating in Kunar Province was fired on from positions inside Pakistan (see this week’s Afghanistan Report). The Army has acknowledged that NATO informed the Pakistani authorities of alleged firing across the border before the air strikes were called in, but denies that any shooting originated from inside Pakistan.

Unlike previous disputes between the two administrations – such as the circumstances in which Osama bin Laden was killed and the attack on the US Embassy in Kabul in September – Islamabad has the upper hand in this row. Prime Minister Gilani declared that “business as usual” with the US would be suspended, senior officers described the incident as a “deliberate act of aggression” and the US Ambassador issued a public apology. There have also been popular demonstrations in all the major cities in an outpouring of public hostility towards the US.

The Government has announced a series of drastic measures in response: US forces have been instructed to vacate Shamsi air base (in Baluchistan, 300km south-west of Quetta, from where US drones are operated) by 11 December; ISAF supply lines through the Torkham and Chaman border crossings have been closed; Islamabad has withdrawn from the forthcoming Bonn Conference on Afghanistan; and ties with both the US and NATO are being reviewed.

NATO is no longer entirely reliant on the Pakistani supply lines (see our Afghanistan Report) and both Torkham and Chaman have been closed during previous disputes – but the longer the crossings are unavailable, the more serious the implications for ISAF. Drone strikes against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Tribal Areas have long been conducted from Shamsi though unconfirmed reports suggest that the facility may not have been used for this purpose since early 2011. While the loss of Shamsi could cause some disruption to the US drone campaign, the Chairman of the US Senate Intelligence Committee has previously said that drones also operate from bases near Islamabad and Jacobabad. The Government has made no mention of US access to these bases, which may suggest that in reality Islamabad sees some value in the continued deployment of these aircraft.

At the same time as it has spoken out consistently against US drone strikes in Pakistan, its criticisms have been held to have little credibility by the electorate since satellite evidence was reported in early 2009 showing three Predator drones at Shamsi airfield. Forcing the US to leave the Baluchistan base will help the Government recover some popular support and could also strengthen its position relative to the Army, which remains a dominant political force.

In this period Pakistan’s Ambassador to Washington, Husain Haqqani, was forced to resign after he was alleged to have authored a memo which was sent to the US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff seeking Washington’s help in preventing a military coup in Pakistan. Haqqani was unpopular with Pakistan’s military establishment, which is reported to have forced his resignation. Should the Government secure significantly increased popular support as a result of its response to the air strikes on Mohmand, it may be better placed to resist such pressure from the Army in the future.

Meanwhile, al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of US aid worker Warren Weinstein who was seized in Lahore in the summer (see our Report of 19 August). In a message from Ayman al-Zawahiri the movement has demanded an end to air strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen and the freeing of al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners in return for his release. Given these demands, we believe Weinstein will ultimately be killed though he is likely to be kept alive for the foreseeable future for propaganda purposes.

During this period al-Qaeda endorsed violent tactics in Syria for the first time, a response to increasing sectarianism. Meanwhile, there is an increased threat of jihadist attacks in Kenya, Nigeria and Kazakhstan. On the net, new videos illustrated how jihadists will try to gain leadership of uprisings in Yemen, also to exploit Osama bin Laden’s death.

The key points are:

• Al-Qaeda-linked group backs violence in Syria, warns of war with Alawites and Shia; shift in strategy enabled by increasing sectarianism and violence; al-Qaeda will, in time, seek to exploit situation to win leadership of anti-regime groups; if this happens Iranian proxies may become involved which would escalate situation
• Military action in Somalia increases al-Shabab threat to Kenya; group publicly advertises links with al-Qaeda; major attack in north-east Nigeria shows increasing al-Qaeda influence there; local militant group adopting global jihadist ideology, represents increased threat to Western interests, including in capital
• Previously unknown group claims double bombing in Kazakhstan; ‘Soldiers of the Caliphate’ active in Afghanistan and Kazakhstan, suggests growing jihadist presence in Central Asia; likely associated with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan;  single militant kills several police near southern border, suggests wide scope of threat
• Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula uses video to seek leadership of Yemeni uprising; emphasises that it opposed President Saleh before protests began; al-Zawahiri releases message lionising bin Laden, former leader is now symbolic figure; focus on death intended to promote recruitment and radicalisation, reinforce al-Zawahiri’s legitimacy