Police said on 12 May they had arrested a senior Boko Haram commander in Kano, the biggest city in the North. Boko Haram, a local Islamist group with connections to jihadi networks operating in other parts of Africa, has been engaged in an escalating insurgency from its core area of operations in the North-East. Nearly 200 police officers were killed in a series of attacks in Kano on a single day in January alone, in addition to several drive-by shootings and bombs in the city. Last month Boko Haram said it was behind an attack on a church in which 15 people were killed and many more injured. Boko Haram has not commented on the arrest, but in the past has downplayed the importance to the group of those the police had claimed as senior officials.

Police say the man arrested was Suleiman Mohammed, from the Yoruba people in south-west Nigeria, who are Muslim and Christian; the North is predominantly Islamic, with significant Christian minorities, particularly in the Middle Belt, while the South and South-East are overwhelmingly Christian. Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s in Kanuri-speaking parts of Borno state and the North-East. More recently it has also attracted support in the majority Hausa-Fulani community in the North-West though security sources claim the group is a splintered and loosely organized network of factions. The arrest of a Yoruba with an apparently senior operational role in Boko Haram is an indication that the movement has extended its reach to all parts of Muslim Nigeria and may potentially present a security threat beyond its current focus in parts of the core North and the capital, Abuja.

Boko Haram has also continued its campaign in its established theatre with a 4 May raid on a prison facility in Kumshe, a small town in Borno State, where more than 20 suspected Islamists were released. However, local officials in neighbouring Yobe state say a bomb attack on a remote cattle market earlier in the month, in which more than 60 people were killed, appears likely to have been linked to unrelated ethnic and historic tensions in the region.

In the early hours of 8 May Kadima, the main opposition party, agreed to join the Likud-led ruling coalition to form a Government of national unity. Kadima is the largest party in the Knesset with 28 members, and its decision to join the Government will give Prime Minister Netanyahu 94 of the legislature’s 120 seats, the largest ruling coalition since the 1980s.

Netanyahu’s move is politically astute, but it was a surprise since he had been in the process of calling elections for September while Kadima’s new leader, Shaul Mofaz, had said that he would never join a coalition with Likud. However, there are obvious benefits to Mofaz, who has low popularity ratings and whose party was expected to lose more than half its seats if an election was held this year. He now has until October 2013, when the current Parliamentary term must end, to overcome any backlash for reneging on previous commitments and to exploit his new position as Vice Premier (and Netanyahu’s stand-in when the Prime Minister is abroad) to boost his public standing.

The postponement of elections also undermines Kadima and Likud’s rivals. These include a new centrist party led by popular former TV anchorman Yair Lapid, and the Labour Party. While it will benefit from being the main opposition party, Labour had stood to make significant electoral gains had the polls been held as expected in September.

There are also clear benefits for Netanyahu. While Likud was expected to do well in elections, his Government has been hamstrung by its dependence on pro-settlement parties. He now has a more broad-based coalition offering increased political stability. As we reported last time, the Government had been ordered by the courts to dismantle the illegal Ulpana outpost, near the Bet El settlement near Ramallah. Hard-line parties within his coalition oppose this demolition, and Netanyahu risked losing the support of moderate voters if he had refused to implement the court’s ruling. He can now safely ignore such appeals from coalition partners like Yisrael Beiteinu, since their withdrawal from the Government would no longer threaten his majority in Parliament.

The future of the peace process will be central to whether the new coalition can maintain its unity. Kadima was formed by members of Likud and Labour in 2005 to support former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateral disengagement plan, which resettled all Israelis from Gaza and from several West Bank settlements. Kadima’s inclusion in the coalition means that Netanyahu will now have to take a more active approach towards the peace process if he is to retain their support. Nevertheless, the near-term prospects for the peace process remain relatively poor given the lack of any substantive progress in recent years.

Kadima’s presence will also help Netanyahu deal with difficult domestic policy issues. Likud and Kadima immediately announced that their first priority will be replacing the Tal Law, which allows the haredim (ultra-orthodox) to avoid military service, a reform that had been blocked by the two ultra-orthodox parties in the coalition. Most haredim do not even work and, with their numbers having grown significantly, are increasingly seen by large parts of the electorate as undermining the economy. Last year’s tent protest movement was driven by a feeling of social injustice, and tackling this issue may boost Netanyhau’s standing amongst poorer Israelis and undermine Labour’s resurgent support.

Even more ambitiously, Likud and Kadima are also seeking a total overhaul of the political system to dilute the power of smaller parties, which often hold an effective veto power over larger coalition allies. This will be fiercely resisted, but if it can be achieved it will increase the chance of a more measured approach to the most contentious challenges facing the country, including the peace process.

On 20 April Eduardo Campos Espinoza, the National Action Party (PAN) candidate for the Mayoral election in Anáhuac, Nuevo León state, narrowly avoided assassination after suspected Zeta members attacked his residence. Espinoza has stated that he had refused a request to meet members of the Zetas, which is likely the reason he was targeted. Mayors in Mexico are responsible for appointing local police chiefs, and cartels frequently attempt to bribe or intimidate them in order to influence local security. Mayors may also be attacked if they are believed to be working for a rival cartel.

This is the first significant instance of violence relating to the July elections, which include the Presidential race and municipal polls in several states, including Nuevo León. Violence is likely to increase in the next two months as cartels seek to influence voting and intimidate candidates. Furthermore, officials working on the election can also be targeted, and in this period an election trainer (responsible for overseeing that the polls are free and fair) was killed by gunmen in Guerrero state.

During the 2012 World Business Forum in Monterrey, Nuevo León, a US Nobel Laureate stated that organised crime was deterring investment in Mexico and undermining economic development. Levels of violence in Mexico are high, but businesses are rarely directly targeted and fighting is largely concentrated in a few states. There is a risk that businesses may come under attack from gangs seeking extortion payments, but this is usually directed against establishments such as bars and nightclubs.

However, on 18 April gunmen opened fire on a hotel, a pharmacy and other businesses in Cancún, Quintana Roo state. These targets are unusual, as are attacks in Cancún – violence would deter tourism which brings in drug sale revenue for the cartels. The shooting occurred early in the morning, indicating that it was not intended to cause casualties. It is therefore likely that a local gang carried out the attack to intimidate small businesses, and the incident does not indicate a developing cartel conflict in the area.

The operating environment is challenged by factors other than security. On 21 April, US store Wal-Mart stated that it will investigate its operations in Mexico over allegations that the company paid up to USD 24 million in bribes for construction permits. Corruption in Mexico is pervasive, and the high-profile Wal-Mart investigation highlights the reputational risk that companies face in doing business there.

Nevertheless, foreign companies are continuing to invest in Mexico and in this period Audi, the German car manufacturer, announced plans to build a new production plant in Mexico. It cited good infrastructure, competitive cost structures and existing free trade agreements as factors that make Mexico attractive for investment.

Elections scheduled to take place in June for the 200-member Constituent Assembly could face postponement due to the Government’s continued inability to maintain security. Two-fifths of the Assembly is to be made up of political associations and laws pertaining to their governance were published in this period which banned religious, regional and tribal platforms in addition to foreign funding. These rules could cause unrest if leading figures or parties are disqualified, especially if the Government acts to limit Islamist presence on the body. Nonetheless, it remains our assessment that the Assembly will be formed essentially along tribal lines with a large Islamist influence and an outright majority remains unlikely.

A change to the election timetable has the potential to cause instability and the National Transitional Council (NTC) so far appears to remain committed to holding the polls in June. Chairman of the NTC, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, has threatened to resign if the Assembly elections are delayed and the council has rejected calls for a change in Government or a Cabinet reshuffle in order to avoid jeopardising the polls. Nonetheless, deteriorating security across Libya, especially in the South, may force a change in the schedule (see our Report of 11 April). In this period, clashes erupted in Kufrah between the Tibu tribe and a Libyan peacekeeping brigade killing two people and wounding four others.

It is likely that elections, whenever they take place, will be marred by violence given the Government’s continued inability to secure strategic sites and control militia fighters. Militias are likely to set up political wings in order to contest the elections and may seek to intimidate voters to secure victory. The European Union is expected to send a mission to aid the authorities in preparation for the elections and it is likely that international monitors will be present during the polls but this will not have a significant impact on security. Cities such as Bani Walid, Sirte and other areas that are associated with the former Gadhafi regime will remain prone to election-related unrest.

Meanwhile, calls for federalism increased in the East, although the movement lacks widespread backing and is likely being promoted by local groups to gain political ground ahead of the June elections. Ahmed Zubair al-Senussi, Libya’s longest serving political prisoner under Colonel Gadhafi and a descendent of King Idris I, was previously elected leader of the interim council of Cyrenaica (the semi-autonomous eastern region declared in March). In this period, al-Senussi declared the council’s intention to establish a security apparatus that will serve alongside the Army. While the lack of support for federalism makes it unlikely that these measures will be implemented, the fragmentation of Libya remains an emotive issue and could spark unrest as witnessed on 9 March in Benghazi (see our Report of 21 March).

A United Nations convoy was attacked with an explosive device in Benghazi on 10 April. No casualties were reported and this marks the first time a foreign mission has been attacked since the revolution last year. The East remains a stronghold for jihadists and the choice of target points to their involvement. We believe there is a threat to Western interests in the long term in these areas especially if Islamists feel sidelined from the political process.

The forthcoming first anniversary of the death of Osama bin Laden on 2 May has prompted increased jihadist rhetoric, as has the attempt by the UK to deport Jordanian cleric Abu Qatada, including messages from the highest levels of al-Qaeda. The movement’s strategy for attacks in the West has evolved in recent years, and although the inspiration of lone actors has become increasingly important, the direct threat from al-Qaeda Central and its franchises remains.

The key points are:

-Rise in jihadist rhetoric ahead of anniversary of bin Laden’s death and Abu Qatada’s possible deportation; al-Qaeda threatens attacks on UK if Qatada is returned to Jordan; main risk from individuals inspired by propaganda material, but warnings from franchises suggests risk of organised attack remains as London Olympics loom

-Raids follow Toulouse siege, but largely driven by political pressure ahead of French Presidential election; heightened anti-Islamic sentiment in France may provoke further attacks; formal claim by al-Qaeda for Merah’s attacks unlikely given movement’s desire to encourage lone actors

-Declaration of Islamic Emirate in northern Mali represents victory for Islamists; Swiss hostage freed as they attempt to consolidate position; Berlin threatened by al-Qaeda over Nigeria kidnap victim; female jihadist prisoner subsequently released, possibly in response to threat of attacks in Germany viewed as credible

On 6 April the newly-formed Frontline Socialist Party (FSP) accused the security forces of abducting two political leaders, Premkumar Gunaratham and Dimuthu Attygalle, in the capital. Gunaratham has Australian citizenship and so Canberra quickly put pressure on Colombo to determine his whereabouts. This adds to the growing international attention on such abductions, which are not uncommon in Sri Lanka. The most recent UN Human Rights Council session noted that 19 people have disappeared in 2012, while the US Embassy has asked about 30 cases. The opposition has credibly accused the security forces of being behind the abductions.

The two FSP leaders were “found” in Colombo on 9 April and Gunaratham has since been deported back to Australia, most likely because of the pressure from Canberra. Both have blamed the security forces, and stated that they were asked about their group’s funding, international support, future plans and ties to the Tamil diaspora. These questions illustrate Colombo’s ongoing concerns about internal opposition and a possible Tamil Tiger resurgence. Most abductions occur in the North, but this incident serves as a reminder that there is also a risk in the capital. Furthermore, there is also a precedent for employees of international organisations to be targeted, as in 2007 two ethnic Tamil Red Cross workers were abducted and killed in Colombo, likely by the security forces.

The FSP is a splinter from the JVP, a Marxist group that attempted to topple the Government in the 1980s, but whose influence has since diminished and is now largely limited to fomenting industrial unrest. It is unlikely that the FSP has significant links to the Tigers or the wider Tamil diaspora, as the two are not common allies. The incident nonetheless suggests that the security forces fear such a link may evolve and are continuing their efforts to identify the channels through which international funding can reach the opposition inside Sri Lanka.

Security operations against suspected Tiger supporters continue and the Army has stated that suspected militants are believed to have entered the country following training in India. Earlier media reports stated that there are three Tiger camps in Tamil Nadu, and that 150 recruits have received training there. Delhi has denied these claims, but they allow Colombo to justify ongoing operations against those in the Tamil community (and may also alleviate pressure on Delhi from politicians in Tamil Nadu demanding a firmer stance over Colombo’s human rights abuses).

It is unlikely that forced disappearances will cease due to Colombo’s ongoing concerns regarding internal dissent and the Tigers. This latest case demonstrates that international pressure can force the Government to release prominent figures, but the international focus remains on reconciliation progress with the Tamils rather than tackling this issue. Efforts to reach a political settlement and reconciliation with the Tamils will however be complicated by ongoing abductions as they add to the community’s grievances.

On 4 March the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, escaped a sophisticated assassination attempt when two shots fired by a sniper (or snipers) just missed him outside his residence in Maarab, north of Beirut. No one has been arrested following the attack, but it is highly likely it was carried out at the behest of Damascus.

Geagea is an important part of the pro-Western March 14 opposition which has challenged the Government’s support for the Assad regime in Syria. His militia represents a significant military capability and we believe he is involved in smuggling arms to the Syrian rebels. Jordan has moved to crack down on arms transfers, and so more weapons destined for the Free Syrian Army (FSA) will now be transported via Lebanon. With Arab and Gulf states increasingly calling for the arming of the Syrian opposition, the importance of Lebanon as a transit route for weapons to the rebels is likely to continue to rise. As such, it is likely that Geagea was targeted for his support – both actual and potential – for the FSA.

The attack on Geagea is a further demonstration of how events in Syria can impact Lebanon. If the assassination had been successful, it is likely that Geagea’s supporters would have retaliated by attacking Hizballah and its allies, prompting further escalation and potentially risking civil war. Saad Hariri has not been able to return to Lebanon for fear he might be targeted, and both he and Geagea have stated that the country is now returning to an era of political assassinations. As violence in Syria worsens, we believe such incidents will become more likely in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, has called upon the authorities to fulfil their humanitarian responsibilities towards the Syrian refugees. Hizballah has so far refused to establish refugee camps, ostensibly in order not to bring the Syrian conflict into Lebanon. However, it is more likely that the group is concerned that camps would encourage further migration and could be infiltrated by rebel fighters. The March 14 faction has criticised this decision, and various Islamic charities have stated that they will attempt to set up camps to accommodate the refugees.

Jumblatt is part of the Hizballah-dominated administration, but has been increasingly critical of Damascus in recent months, breaking ranks with the Government’s official position. This has led to speculation that Jumblatt will withdraw from the ruling coalition. However he has stated that his support for the Syrian uprising does not mean he will alter his domestic alliances, and that his Ministers will remain in the Cabinet. While his interests have increasingly aligned with the March 14 bloc, this suggests that he still has sufficient incentive to stay in the Government. However, Jumblatt has invariably aligned himself with the dominant force in Lebanese politics and he could yet switch sides.

Finally, popular anger over the actions of the Syrian security forces has increased further following the death of a Lebanese cameraman on 9 April when Syrian troops opened fire against members of the al-Jadeed satellite television channel, who were on Lebanon’s side of the border. Prime Minister Mikati has launched an investigation, but this is unlikely to lead to any meaningful action as the Government will not want to criticise the Syrian forces. The Syrian security forces also reportedly fired rocket propelled grenades into Lebanon, and destroyed farm buildings and clashed with Syrian rebels in Lebanon in this period. Public discontent over the actions of the Syrian military is likely to continue to rise, further aggravating sectarian tensions in Lebanon, potentially leading to clashes.

Parliament opened its fifth session on 17 March, allowing MPs to begin debating relations with the US following the November 2011 NATO airstrike which killed 25 Pakistani soldiers. Ties have recovered significantly in recent months; Prime Minister Gilani and President Obama met for the first time since then on 27 March. Washington will therefore push for a closer relationship, for example reopening supply routes to Afghanistan and possibly even restarting cooperation on fighting militancy, which the Government will support. However, the opposition vehemently opposes such moves and will likely try to delay this conclusion being reached. When it is, however, the opposition will (as it has threatened to) disrupt Parliament and organise mass demonstrations, worsening political instability.

The Taliban stated that it would watch the debate with interest and threatened to target Parliamentarians if supplies to US troops in Afghanistan are allowed to resume. The Taliban is likely to avoid any major attacks away from the Afghanistan border (where major instability continues, see below) so long as ending NATO supplies remains a possible, if improbable, outcome of the debate. Nonetheless, militants will seek to punish any decision to resume them or failure to pass a motion specifically ruling them out and, when that happens (likely in the next month or two), there will be a far greater risk of a major incident in the main cities.

The new Parliamentary session allowed President Zardari to give his fifth ever address to Parliament, a record for a non-military Pakistani leader (as was his fourth appearance last year). However, it marks the start of preparations for the General Election, which must be held in the coming year, and was marred by disruptions from opposition figures. Meanwhile, power shortages sparked violent protests in Lahore and other major cities in this period. Political instability, disruptions by opposition members and the need to pursue populist policies ahead of the polls will hamper the Government’s ability to introduce the reforms needed to address this kind of serious underlying problem.

The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which is part of the coalition Government, threatened not to attend Zardari’s speech over continued violence in Karachi. MQM was eventually persuaded to take part by increased security operations in the city. However, this provoked yet further violence, particularly the Lyari area adjoining the central business district, and the killing of three MQM figures. The party subsequently boycotted Parliament anyway. Its nuanced response to events in Karachi shows that MQM does not want to cause the Government to fall. However, the administration cannot rely on coalition allies for support, further weakening its ability to push through legislation.

The killings and subsequent siege in south-west France may have been intended to avenge the death of Osama bin Laden as well as to show al-Qaeda’s continued support for the Palestinian cause. They also provide an insight into how al-Qaeda’s strategy for attacks in the West has evolved in recent years, and so give some idea what form future incidents may take. In particular, they showed the movement’s desire to prolong media coverage of events. In the meantime, the acceptance of the Somali group al-Shabab into the al-Qaeda family could provide the movement with a long-awaited opportunity to attack shipping lanes in the Red Sea.

The key points are:

• Toulouse siege and killings may have been intended to avenge death of bin Laden; late al-Qaeda leader mentioned France in final message, first successful attacks in Western Europe since his death; actions of French Government demonstrate concern at possible influence on election

• French incident demonstrates al-Qaeda’s evolving tactics; failed bomb plots in West since 2005 have led to new focus on publicity-generating sieges, firearms and individuals; cells more vulnerable to security force surveillance and infiltration

• Al-Shabab could threaten strategic Bab al-Mandab strait following acceptance into al-Qaeda, link up with Puntland group; attacks on shipping are long-term al-Qaeda goal

During this period Parliament voted in favour of initiating no-confidence proceedings against Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri’s Government. Although the motion has no legal force since the ruling Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) retains the right to dismiss the Cabinet, it will have increased the pressure on the SCAF. We previously predicted that the Muslim Brotherhood would intensify calls for the Government to be replaced in order to win concessions from the SCAF over the composition of the Constituent Assembly (CA) – the body responsible for drafting the constitution. The no-confidence proceedings were therefore most likely instigated in order to capitalise on the SCAF’s weakened position following the Government’s lifting of a travel ban on US citizens implicated in alleged illicit foreign funding of NGOs (see our last Report).

It was later announced that the CA will consist of 50 Parliamentarians and 50 representatives to include legal experts, academics and religious scholars – an outcome favourable to the Brotherhood’s interests. In a further attempt to defuse the situation the SCAF also offered to replace two Cabinet Ministers, although the Brotherhood has yet to accept.

Both the Brotherhood and the SCAF are wary of inciting violent clashes, such as those in November when the military council attempted to limit Islamist influence in the CA (see our Special Report of 21 November). The military council has already been criticised for its inability to maintain security since the revolution last year and the Brotherhood would stand to lose credibility if it was seen to be inciting violent protests. Therefore we do not expect tensions to be allowed to escalate to the point of triggering large-scale demonstrations in the near future. It remains likely that the SCAF and the Brotherhood will seek to cooperate in supporting a Presidential candidate who is aligned with both their aspirations for the post-transition period, though so far no likely contender has emerged.

However, ongoing trials relating to last year’s uprising will remain a source of unrest. In this period a military court acquitted a doctor accused of conducting virginity tests on female activists. Hundreds of protesters rallied in Cairo against the ruling and the defendant is considering an appeal. Furthermore, twelve prominent activists are being investigated for inciting hatred against the military and trying to overthrow the Government. The probe is a likely attempt to intimidate the individuals but it could instigate protests by liberal factions.

In this period, Pope Shenouda III died after a prolonged illness and was mourned by thousands in the Coptic Christian community at his funeral in Cairo. The Pope was seen as a unifying figure capable of calming tensions between the Islamist and Coptic communities and able to contain more radical Copts. Shenouda played a key role in preventing a further escalation in violence following clashes in Cairo in October 2011 during which 25 Christians were killed. It is unlikely that Shenouda’s successor will be similarly charismatic. However, the Islamists currently remain committed to engaging with Coptic leaders.